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On a general theoretical foundation for endocrinology 
Hugo A. van den Berg 
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Abstract — Hormones are messenger molecules that distribute across all tissues and thus 
operate on the whole-organism level. Moreover, a given hormone typically affects a number 
of different biological processes. As such, hormones coordinate concerted cooperation be-
tween the cells and tissues of an organism, a phenomenon that has been termed “organismal 
harmony.” Furthermore, a concept that recently has been gaining traction is that hormones 
mediate or represent life-history trade-offs which are ultimately moulded by evolutionary 
pressures. Here, this concept is extended to include all “decisions” or “choices” that are 
made at the organismal level. A formal framework is sketched to explore the proposition 
that organismal biology, together with the “fitness landscape,” suffice in principle to deter-
mine a minimalistic dynamics of the endocrine system. 
Keywords: Endocrinology, fitness, mathematical biology, evolution of the endocrine sys-
tem, philosophy of biology 
Introduction 
Newcomers to endocrinology find themselves faced with the bewildering complexity that 
arises as each hormone affects not just one, but an entire “suite” of physiological or devel-
opmental processes. Moreover, each such process is typically the target of several hor-
mones1, which obliges the poor student to memorise lists of hormonal actions and their var-
ious cross-talking connections. To understand the latter, it may help to visualise them graph-
ically, for instance as stops along underground railway lines, where each line corresponds to 
a given hormone (Fig. 1). Endocrinologists use the term pleiotropy in reference to the phe-
nomenon that the hormonal suites are, generally speaking, not singleton sets1. 
 We may wonder whether such complexity is more or less accidental: an outcome of 
evolution where historical contingencies have created so to speak a series of patches upon 
bungs upon repairs, resulting in a structure that is much more complicated than it strictly 
needs to be, “ideally speaking.” Indeed, we might well suppose that an equally effective en-
docrine system could look like the one depicted in Fig. 2. Here, each target process has its 
own dedicated hormone, i.e. the system is non-pleiotropic (also, when the concentration of 
he hormone is low, the process is deemed to go in one direction, and this is reversed when 
the concentration is high). Whereas the student of endocrinology would be grateful for a 
highly simplified configuration such as the one shown in Fig. 2, it is not clear that this sim-
plicity would be evolutionarily favoured. 
 For instance, we observe that a larger number of distinct hormonal messengers is re-
quired in the system depicted in Fig. 2. Each hormone needs the support of multiple genes: 
not only for the production of the hormone itself (a distinction can be drawn here between 
proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous hormones) but also for its receptor and the signalling 
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cascades associated with that receptor1. In principle, the need for additional genes may de-
press the reproduction rate and this would adversely affect fitness.  Thus natural selection 
would favour pleiotropy. What counts against this argument is that “genomic space” does 
not seem to be at a particular premium. Even for the smallest mammals (and indeed, for 
most multicellular organisms), this load does not seem to be a major bottleneck: we need 
only reflect on the existence of long stretches of apparently non-coding DNA that lie be-
tween the genes2. 
Figure 1 on top of  the first page following the title page; 
Figure 2 on top of  the next page 
 There are other factors that could account for the persuasive presence of pleiotropy in 
endocrine systems. For one thing, sheer complexity might constitute a benefit in its own 
right. According to this line of thinking, networks with redundant connections are more ro-
bust, that is, better equipped to withstand perturbations or partial destruction3. 
 Yet another explanation is that the pattern itself of the pleiotropy of any given hor-
mone could have a particular functional or physiological significance1. For instance, insulin 
stimulates processes that collectively act to lower the blood glucose concentration, whereas 
glucagon has the opposite effects, and cortisol safeguards the availability of energy even 
under conditions of prolonged restriction of nutrient supplies, at the possible cost of catabol-
ic degradation of all reserves, including the muscle mass (see Fig. 1). Each of these suites 
can thus be viewed as a coherent set of concerted endocrinological interventions. The inter-
pretation of pleiotropic suites as “physiological modes,” e.g. “metabolic modes” in the ex-
ample of Fig. 1, is entirely compatible with the idea of complexity as robustness — the dif-
ference being that on the complexity explanation per se, the network configuration is more 
or less arbitrary, whereas the explanation based on modes attributes a particular significance 
to the system in its ultimate shape. 
 The notion of endocrine suites as functional modes raises several deep biological 
questions. One is whether the functional significance that we attribute to these suites, in a 
more or less ad hoc fashion, by inspection and intuition, can be endowed with a rigorous 
footing. This would endow these modes with some kind of objective reality, even if they are 
entangled by the basic fact that we noted above: hormones have multiple targets and each 
target is typically subject to several hormones1. 
 Furthermore, if the “suites as modes” concept is tenable, then these modes must nec-
essarily acquire meaning at the whole-organism level. That is to say, the concept presuppos-
es that there is such a thing as unity of purpose at this level, an organismal harmony. Hor-
mones are by their very nature well placed to play a central role in maintaining organismal 
harmony, since they are dissolved in the fluids that bathe the cells and thus can provide a 
consistent signal at a global level, spanning the entire organism. To view this point in the 
proper light, we should remember that even multicellular organisms that are barely visible 
to the naked eye are in fact enormous relative to the basic scale of life, which is that of 
macro-molecular machinery and cells. 
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Umwelt: Kennwelt and Wirkwelt  
The unitary nature of the organism expresses itself precisely through the fact that certain 
choices are made at this level, such as fight versus flight (short time scales), hunt / forage 
versus rest / digest (intermediate time scales), and somatic growth versus reproduction 
(longer time scales)4. When we say that an organism ‘decides’ between the ‘available op-
tions’ (i.e. chooses), we merely mean that a path is picked from among several alternatives, 
without necessarily implying any grounding in conscious deliberation, or whatever else it is 
that humans do to make up their minds (calculations, simulations…). For choice in a mini-
malistic sense, all that is really required is some sort of centralised process that integrates 
the available information or stimuli that bear on these decisions (Fig. 3). The entirety of op-
tions available to an individual organism defines a universe of covert and overt actions 
which was termed the Wirkwelt by Jakob von Uexküll5. This Wirkwelt, which might be ren-
dered in English as “universe of effect” naturally varies from individual from individual, 
may also depend on its life stage, and will most certainly be highly specific to the species. 
 Given a Wirkwelt, one can deduce, in principle, which information will be most rele-
vant to making adaptive (that is, fitness-enhancing) choices. There is obviously little to be 
gained in acquiring and processing stimuli that would not inform a choice among the ele-
ments of the Wirkwelt (although they could be highly salient in the context of the Wirkwelt 
of a different species). On the other hand, even if we identify stimuli and phenomena that, 
objectively viewed, ought to be highly salient to the given Wirkwelt, we might find they are 
not sensed by the organism; after all, there is a cost accrued by creating and maintaining, 
e.g. the sensory organs and the neural circuitry to process the information. This being the 
case, we would expect natural selection to act so as to find a suitable equilibrium, a com-
promise between the gathering and processing of “theoretically significant” stimuli and the 
burden associated with growing the necessary apparatus. 
 In Uexküll’s natural philosophy, this compromise is known as the organism’s Ken-
nwelt5. Although it is impossible for a human to know “what it is like” to be a bat, it is emi-
nently possible to study a bat’s Kennwelt, its “sensory universe.” Taken together, Kennwelt 
and Wirkwelt are known as the organism’s Umwelt5. Although we have been discussing 
these ideas with a tacit reference to organisms that have some form of central nervous sys-
tem (since we began with the example of mammalian endocrinology in mind), the concept 
of Umwelt = Kennwelt + Wirkwelt extends to all living beings. 
Hormones as the mediators of organismal harmony 
The argument from organismal harmony explains pleiotropy as a byproduct of unity of pur-
pose at the level of the whole organism, and of hormones acting in concert for these purpos-
es. This notion frequently crops up in informal conversations among (neuro)endocrinolo-
gists in common rooms and seminars, where talk of ‘purpose’ is less likely to face censure. 
In more formal settings, the life scientists would do well to hesitate to invoke purpose, goal, 
etc., since these terms bear a suspicious teleological burden. We shall revisit the role of tele-
ology in regulatory biology in the closing section. For now, let us just tip our hats to the 
usual justification: life history evolution provides the underpinnings that make such talk re-
spectable; the informality just spares us the trouble of cumbersome circumlocution.  
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 Figure 3 
Organismal harmony encompasses the coherence of the organism’s Umwelt, which requires 
concerted coordination of activity across different organs and tissues. Local adjustments are 
made to accord with the global (i.e., Umwelt-level) decision. The latter is often analysed in 
terms of a trade-off: the fitness that alternative A might have contributed is bargained 
against the fitness associated with alternative B4,6. It is prima facie reasonable to suppose 
that the trade-offs achieved are balancing points at which fitness is maximised; however, the 
application of optimisation ideas to evolutionary scenarios can be fraught7. 
 The term life history trade-off is used primarily when discussing the intermediate-to-
lifetime scales, although the trade-off concept is relevant across the entire continuum of 
time scales. For instance, the pond snail Lymnaea stagnalis maintains a particular concen-
tration of sodium ions in its hæmolymph; under conditions of low sodium concentrations in 
the external medium, such maintenance requires the uptake of external sodium ions by ac-
tive mechanisms in the integument to make up for passive and urinary losses8. The substan-
tial fitness benefits of maintaining a stable electrolyte environment in the fluid that bathes 
the tissues are traded off against the opportunity costs incurred when energy is invested in 
transporting ions against the overall anbient/hæmolymph gradient and molecular building 
blocks are invested in synthesising the molecular machinery that mediates this transport. 
 As the hæmolymph sodium ion concentration falls, the snail's neuro-endocrine sys-
tem secretes Sodium-Influx Stimulating peptide8. The resulting elevated levels of this pep-
tide hormone in the hæmolymph represent the drive to maintain a (nearly) constant hæ-
molymph concentration. We might say that the hormone effectively urges the integument to 
take up sodium. 
 Indeed, the word hormone derives from ὁρµῶν (hormon), the present participle of 
ὁρµᾶν (horman), ‘to set in motion’ or ‘urge’ which in turn goes back to ὁρµή (horme) which 
might be translated as ‘onset,’ ‘urge,’ or ‘impulse.’ In the teachings of the Stoic philoso-
phers, this ὁρµή could be aroused by an external stimulus or internal stirrings of the 
body9,10; it is perhaps not too fanciful to regard these arousals as the Stoic counterpart of 
Uexküll’s Kennwelt, the sum total of sensory stimuli available to a given organism (Fig. 3). 
 The way the Stoics rendered ὁρµή in Latin tells us much about their thinking: ap-
petite for instance, deriving from adpĕtītĭo, ‘that which is sought or desired;’ and similar 
terms that ultimately gave rise to our impulse and impetus9. The Stoics regarded these im-
pulses as natural processes which happen in and around our bodies — quite independently 
of our will. The distinction between what is and what is not under the control of human voli-
tion played a central role in Stoic philosophy9. Accordingly, Stoics praised above all the 
ability to control these natural urges by exerting judgement and self-discipline, which lend 
or withhold assent (συγκατάθεσή = synkatatheste) to these drives10. 
 It may be of some interest that the Stoics did not always differentiate clearly between 
afferent and efferent signals, as the ὁρµή was both inciting stimulus arising from physiologi-
cal or external events and the urge to act in the natural way, following what we might envis-
age as the “path of least resistance” for the organism9,10. Channeling and regulating this nat-
ural flow thus becomes tantamount to asserting our humanity, given that beasts were sup-
posed to simply go with this flow. 
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 Figure 4  
While the distinction between afferent (incoming information) and efferent (outgoing in-
formation) is key to the central nervous system (CNS), in the endocrine system we find that 
the bearers of ὁρµή do in fact play a dual role. Factors such as insulin and leptin can be 
viewed as efferent in the sense of directing peripheral physiology, but they act at the same 
time as afferent to the CNS, where hypothalamic centres sense their presence and adjust or-
ganismal homeostasis in the basis of the information received11. 
 Modern science defines hormones, the molecules that mediate ὁρµή, more precisely: 
they are humoral signalling molecules that are distributed throughout the body via the blood 
or hæmolymph compartment, as opposed to paracrine, autocrine, and juxtacrine factors, 
which are confined to the immediate tissue environment1. All such factors are called first 
messengers in contradistinction to second messengers, signalling molecules that trigger in-
tracellular signalling cascades. Synaptic communication by means of neurotransmitters can 
be regarded as a special case of paracrine/autocrine signalling1. First messengers usually 
evoke cellular responses by engaging receptors situated at the exterior side of the membrane 
of the target cell, but they may also engage intracellular receptors, in which case signalling 
is intracrine1.  
 Hormones play a central role as regulators of life history trade-offs. For instance, 
testosterone mediates the trade-off between reproduction and immunity in the bird Junco 
hyemalis4; follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) mediates the trade-off between egg number 
and egg size in the lizard Uta stansburiana13; and juvenile hormone (JH) mediates the trade-
off between flight capability and reproduction in the insect Gryllus firmus6. The choice be-
tween, on the one hand, investments in somatic mass and endurance, and on the other hand, 
direct investment in offspring, is among the most consequential life history trade-offs: in-
vestment in the former can, with suitable discounting, be leveraged into more of the latter, 
albeit later in life7. It is this juvenile/larva → adult transition (or, more generally, non-repro-
ductive → reproductive phase transitions, possibly iterated) where pleiotropy manifests itself 
most dramatically, since the different life stages often entail profound physiological, 
anatomical, and biochemical differences. The Endopterygota (or holometabolic insects) 
constitute an example par excellence, with individuals undergoing a radical metamorphosis 
through a pupal stage in which the entire body mass is reorganised. The pleiotropic suite of 
JH in the holometabolic insect Drosophila includes numerous targets, involving virtually all 
aspects of the phenotype, such as metamorphosis, development and differentiation of adult 
body structures, reproductive organs, pheromone production, locomotor and courtship be-
haviour, division of labour in social insects, brain structure and function14. The radical re-
alignment of purpose at the whole-organism level  is a change of key of the organismal 
harmony, and correlates with an extensive suite of JH targets. Perhaps ‘purpose’ here begins 
to acquire a more respectable sense, imposed by the evolutionary forces in the background. 
 From an evolutionary point of view, trade-offs represent balancing points between 
evolutionary pressures4. At the level of neuro-endocrine regulation, the trade-off is a balance 
of opposing drives, negotiated by hormones and other first messengers1. Combining these 
two perspectives, we perceive first messengers to be tokens of the evolutionary pressures 
(i.e. fitness differentials) that govern such trade-offs1. However, if first messengers (and 
perhaps second messengers as well) are truly tokens of selection, it would seem that we 
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have quite a bit of explaining to do. For one thing, humeral messengers necessarily act over 
time scales several orders of magnitude shorter than the typical life span of the organism, 
whereas the latter act over time scales several orders of magnitude longer. Thus we are led 
to wonder whether “hormones betoken evolution” is a true biological principle or simply an 
elegant heuristic to arrange our facts and figures. 
 Figure 5 
Of ! -systems and ! -systems 
Let us begin by stating that biological systems exhibit regulation and that this regulation is 
organised in the form of, among other things, feedback loops15. What do these feedback 
loops do? They tend to drive a biological system away from a given physiological state with 
an urgency that is proportional to the “maladaptiveness” of that state, and toward more 
adaptive states (but for the cost-trade off proviso we noted above). How do hormones act? 
They do not typically carry the energy needed to drive the responses they elicit (in the sense 
that the required ΔG would be liberated upon their degradation in the target tissue). Their 
role is strictly that of a messenger, triggering certain responses in cells that carry receptors 
for the hormone at hand, called the target cells. Gene expression may be altered, trans-
porters may be activated, membrane permeabilities changed, biochemical pathways set in 
motion or slowed down, development of certain tissues (e.g. with a reproductive function) 
started or arrested, and so on1. This messenger / target duality is apparent from Fig. 1 where 
the coloured lines are the messengers and the ‘stops’ are the regulated processes. 
 If we look at the messenger / target duality from the point of view of physiology, we 
will be able to identity certain points where the messengers exert their influence on the dy-
namics of the system (Fig. 4). Let us call these points the actuators. These are the particular 
physiological parameters that change value in response to an endocrine signal, and in this 
way alter the trajectory of the physiological dynamics. In mathematical terms, one might 
surmise that the gradient of the dynamics with respect to these actuator parameters contains 
the necessary information to determine the connectivity structure of the control network. 
Indeed, it turns out that this insight is a key step toward objectively defining suites in terms 
of coordinated organismal modes17. 
 The classification of variables as either actuator variables or physiological variables 
‘proper’ is somewhat arbitrary, but it is elucidated by a familiar problem in mathematical 
biology. Physiological variables ‘proper’ (the coloured boxes in Fig. 3) are generally 
straightforward to model; this is not to say that the task is without its challenges, but simply 
that basic physicochemical principles such as conservation laws tend to go a long way to-
ward mathematical closure (a term of art mathematicians use to indicate that the dynamics 
of the state can be fully specified on terms of the state itself). This closure often proves to be 
considerably more problematic in the case of the actuator variables. To specify these as 
functions of time, we require a mathematical model of the neuro-endocrine system (the 
black boxes in Fig. 4), whose output dictates the values of the actuators. 
 The simplest way to arrive at such a model begins by identifying the afferent inputs 
to the system. This would include physiological variables whose values are relevant on the 
behaviour of the actuator we are trying to model. Usually some sort of sensor mechanism 
provides the afferent signals. Next, we identify the efferent outputs, which include the actu-
q Q
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ator variable we are interested in. We then try to find a mathematical function that maps the 
input to the output. 
Figure 6 
 For example, as shown in Fig. 4, the black box marked ‘β’ representing the pancreat-
ic beta cells that monitor glucose and secrete insulin in response1. If we take the insulin se-
cretion rate to represent the actuator variable in our model, we could propose a simple func-
tion  that maps glucose concentration to the insulin secretion rate18. Insulin affects 
the rates of a number of physiological processes, as shown in Fig. 1, and accordingly we 
need to keep track of the dynamics of insulin in the blood and the manner in which these 
more distal actuators depend on the blood plasma insulin concentration18. 
 The black box marked ‘CNS’ (central nervous system) in Fig. 4 poses a greater chal-
lenge. At the neuroanatomical level, we can locate the structures in the brain that mediate 
this rather more intricate input-output mapping12; some of these are shown in Fig. 5. Both 
the inputs and outputs of this system have been identified11, allowing us to draw up a puta-
tive wiring diagram (Fig. 6). 
 In general, if we have 2  inputs and 2  outputs, our first attempt would be to construct 
a function 2  on the basis of the available data. Let us consider the case where we 
find this to be impossible (otherwise there is not much to say). Then if the system is finitely 
deterministic (which is a reasonable assumption for a regulatory system) there is a finite in-
teger 2  such that there does exist a function 2  that describes the 2  actuators (this 
is the system’s output map19). Moreover, the coordinates in the additional  dimensions of 
the domain of this mapping cannot all have the same values, at all points in time where we 
measured; for otherwise we could set 2  which would imply that the 2  map 
should have worked after all. Incidentally, time resolution plays a central role in this argu-
ment, in the sense that coarse-graining the resolution in time (i.e. averaging over smaller 
time windows) will allow us to reduce 2 , perhaps even all the way to zero. However, in gen-
eral we have to be prepared to deal with the case 2 ; importantly, we will have to ac-
count for the time-varying behaviour of these coordinates. 
 The term ‘coordinates’ is somewhat misleading, in the following sense: given one 
example of the desired map 2 , we can precompose this map with a map that is 
arbitrary as long as it is invertible and the identity in the first 2  arguments (but not the final 
2 ), and we have constructed another 2  map that serves the purpose just as well. 
In other words: we have to think of whatever exists in these additional 2  dimensions as a 
single, coordinate-independent, entity. The proper name for this entity is the state. The rules 
that describe how the state evolves over time are collectively called the state’s dynamics19. 
As a special case, these rules might actually allow the state to remain the unchanged as time 
elapses. In this special, so-called static, case we are thrown back to the much simpler 
2  mapping. 
 While there do exist general abstract methods to identify the state19, they typically 
require many more observational data points then are available, and for this reason mathe-
matical modellers have to resort to heuristics. One of these is to identify key physiological 
variables, each of which can be deemed likely to fulfil the role of a “ 2 -coordinate” (i.e., a 
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tem (and biology in general)20. The dynamics of the state are then specified, for instance in 
the form of differential equations, which is a formalism that usually suits the causal struc-
ture of the subject20. The effectiveness of this approach is such that it has become virtually 
synonymous with mathematical modelling20. 
 In the case at hand, the problem is not really that we struggle to identify candidate 
state variables. On the contrary, the problem is rather an embarrassment of riches. We know 
quite well how to describe action potentials, synaptic communication, hormone secretion, 
receptor binding and signalling cascades, and so on20. However, if we were to incorporate 
all this knowledge into a mathematical model, we would quickly find that 2  has a discon-
certing tendency to grows beyond any reasonable bound. 
 Well, who is to say where we should put a “reasonable bound”? There is a school of 
thought that holds that we should not worry when 2  runs into the thousands (or even tens or 
hundreds of thousands…), as modern computing technology has eliminated the problem. 
The computer can simulate it all, and if the computer is big enough, it will even do so faster 
than real time. This attitude of “simulate the lot” is indubitably a defensible philosophical 
stance. In practice, however, there are several snags. Assigning reliable values to all parame-
ters is one of them (but perhaps this becomes less important when 2  is very large). Another 
snag is that, besides the mysteries of the original biological system, the modellers have now 
created an equally impenetrable in silico system, an entity that lives in the computer which 
may or may not be a faithful simulacrum (we hope so, but even then we never know if it is 
accurate for the “right” reasons). If we are thus driven to formulate a tractable (which would 
also mean: a lower-dimensional) theory to account for the simulation model — a meta-
model — it will dawn on us that we cannot escape a fundamental question: what is the 
smallest 2  that allows a map 2  to  perform with sufficient accuracy? Perhaps we 
ought to have started with that question. 
 The latter “minimal state” stance distinguishes itself from the “just simulate the lot” 
approach in several ways. We anticipate that, should the min- 2  problem have a solution, it 
will also be “the” solution in the sense that any other solutions we might find will only dif-
fer from the original one in more or less unimportant ways. Moreover, if we are able to de-
fine a coordinate system for the minimal 2 -space in such a way that the individual coordi-
nates permit biological interpretation, then so much the better, but we are not necessarily 
expecting or demanding this. In other words, the minimal state variables will probably not 
correspond to familiar quantities such as concentrations of solutes in certain compartments, 
receptor densities, membrane potentials, and so on. The truth is that such a guarantee never 
inhered in the state concept, notwithstanding common prejudice which, as we have pointed 
out, merely springs from the popularity of one particular modelling heuristic. 
 There are various approaches to the min- 2  problem. One is applicable when adepts of 
the “simulate the lot” school have in fact gone ahead and produced a dynamical model with 
an ultra-high-dimensional state. Let 2  denote thus model’s state (where we have writ-
ten the dimension as a capital 2  to remind us that 2 ). From simulations of this model, 
we may discover that the state is mostly confined to a low-dimensional subspace, in the 
sense that we can write 2  where 2  with 2  and 
2 . For each 2  there will be an 2  such that 2  is 
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to break the tie somehow). Let us suppose that the original 2 -system dynamics can be writ-
ten in the following form: 
2  
where 2  is the vector of monitored variables. The function 2  is what the modelling 
team have provided us with. Then a proposal for the reduced dynamics of a putative “ 2 -sys-
tem” would read: 
2 , 
where 2  denotes the derivative of 2 . The point of this expression is mathematical closure: 
the right-hand side only depends on 2  (and 2 , of course, but not on 2 ). The dynamics has 
been reduced to a 2 -dimensional arena. 
 A solution 2  satisfying the reduced dynamics 2  would induce an approx-
imate solution of the original system 2 . There is no guarantee that this induced 
Ersatz solution 2  will accurately mimic the behaviour of the 2 -system. The Ersatz so-
lution is exact only in the exceptional case where the 2 -system’s trajectory was such that 
2  for all 2 . Barring this non-generic case, we have to expect that  2  may 
deviate from 2  in important qualitative ways, e.g. with different stability or recurrence 
properties. Moreover, from a physics point of view, the Ersatz may violate key principles 
such as conservation properties (even when the 2 -system did not). The latter type of diffi-
culty can be resolved by suitably constraining the construction of either the map 2  or 
2 ; the details, which are usually problem-specific and fairly technical, are beyond the 
scope of the present paper. 
 In any case, whether or not the reduction to a 2 -system has been successful must be 
judged on whether the output is described with sufficient accuracy. In the 2 -system this 
would be represented as a 2  output map 2 . The reduced approximation 
would then be 2  and it is really the fidelity of this output that should be used to 
assess the success of the state reduction. The special static case is the one where 2 ; for 
then we are back at 2  as an 2  mapping. 
Hormones as tokens of evolutionary pressures 
Let us suppose that a 2 -to- 2  reduction as outlined above is not only feasible but also that 
any reasonably comprehensive 2 -system will reduce to a 2 -system that differs from the re-
ductions of any other such 2 -system only in a non-essential manner (at least relative to a 
given output space of actuator variables). We know little about the form the resulting 2 -sys-
tems might take. The foregoing arguments have prepared us to assume that the state vari-
ables of such a system need not, and in all likelihood will not, admit a direct biological in-
terpretation in terms of the components that were explicitly represented in the 2 -system. 
Instead, for the 2 -system we anticipate that we will have variables (a.k.a. phase coordinates 
or dynamic degrees of freedom) of a more abstract nature. To see what form these might 
take, it is perhaps fruitful to return to the concept of hormones as mediators of life-history 





































 An clear example where the physiology appears to resonate perfectly with the con-
cept of hormones as tokens of selective pressure is the regulation of the blood plasma glu-
cose titre. Both low and high “blood sugar” lead to serious adverse effects21, some of which 
are listed in Fig. 7. These morbidities will have a negative impact on the lifetime reproduc-
tive output of the organism, and hence evolution is expected to favour mechanisms that will 
induce a tendency to avoid them. These are known as homeostatic mechanisms15. 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
 The evolutionary “landscape” associated with blood glucose homeostasis is sketched 
in Fig. 8; the optimum value is shown as the lowest point in a valley. The physiological state 
is pictured as a ball that runs down the slopes of the values. The driving forces (gradients of 
the landscape) are depicted as arrows corresponding to the hormones that betoken them. 
 We can take the mechanical analogy one step further and write down the correspond-
ing classical mechanics for this problem, in order to obtain specific equations for a tentative 
2 -system. (For good measure, we would first submerge the system in viscous oil to avoid 
oscillations and spare ourselves an extra differentiation step; also, what is depicted is actual-
ly an inverted fitness landscape, with the highest fitness value occurring at the lowest point.) 
Besides being a picturesque metaphor, does this sketch offer any scope for a fully-fledged 
theory of endocrinology at the “ 2 -system level”? Let us examine a few of the more serious 
objections. 
 First, the insulin-glucagon system might just be a felicitous but otherwise atypical 
example that was cherry-picked as it happens to accord well with the theoretical ideas that 
are being put forward here. However, the approach is applicable to various physiological 
systems, including hydro-mineral regulation, body temperature control, and regulation of 
macro-chemical body composition17,16. 
 Furthermore, it is not clear what is actually set out along the abscissa in Figs. 7 and 8. 
Ostensibly it is the plasma glucose concentration, but this quantity fluctuates during the life-
time of the organism, whereas lifetime reproductive output is a fixed number, for a given 
life history. We could fix this by taking the abscissa to indicate the blood glucose level av-
eraged over the life time. However, the following approach is a bit neater, and also more 
suited to later generalisations. Let 2  denote the glucose level and 2  a U-shaped func-
tion as represented by the “valley” in Fig. 7. Then consider the quantity 
2 . 
Fitness marginalised to 2  (i.e. averaging out all traits except the above integral) is then a 
monotonically decreasing function of 2  (which we might term the unfitness). 
 This 2 -formalism can be generalised in the obvious manner to physiological states of 
any dimension, with the function 2  depending on all of the elements of the corresponding 
state vector. Life-stage dependent variation of the fitness landscape is accommodated in this 
extension, since life stage is subsumed under the concept of state, as is, for that matter, time 
dependence in general19. Although the generalisation is entirely straightforward from a 
mathematical  point of view, one may object, from a biological perspective, that 2  is given, 
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as it were, too much work to do. We are led to suppose that 2  encodes the information re-
garding the connection between physiology and fitness, which prompts us to ask whether 2  
is observable in principle. It is; but the observational data would have to be time-resolved 
several orders of magnitude below the typical intergeneration time 2  but also span a period 
several orders of magnitude longer than 2 , and extend over a vast ensemble of distinct life 
histories17. While one may legitimately object that the theory relies on our ability to over-
come this huge practical obstacle (perhaps eventually; for microorganisms the acquisition of 
such a data set may become a reality in the near future), the point is rather that the same 
fundamental difficulty must be overcome by any sufficiently detailed theory relating evolu-
tion to physiology sensu lato (i.e., physiology in the widest sense of the word). 
 Another objection relates to the way in which the gradients in Fig. 8 were identified 
with actuators (and labelled with the names of hormones that form the bridge between the 
actuators and the gradients of 2 ). In this case, it suffices to inspect Fig. 1 (or any other chart 
or table conveying the same information) and identify actuators that would tend to raise 
blood glucose or lower it, respectively. Strong depressing actuators are “stations” along the 
“insulin line” whereas strong elevating actuators lie along the “glucagon line” — there is 
nothing coincidental or surprising about this, but the question we are really interested here is 
how we could have worked this out, even if we did not remember these facts from our en-
docrinology book. The objection, then, is that there ought to be a systematic way to deter-
mine the coupling strengths that should prevail, intervening between the gradients of 2  and 
the “pushes” or “pulls” on the actuators. 
 This is not a trivial problem since a given actuator will affect a certain subset of the 
physiological state variables in the positive direction, and another subset in the negative di-
rection (one of these subsets may be empty). Conversely, a given physiological state vari-
able may be governed by more than one actuator (it has to be at least one, lest the physio-
logical variable be insusceptible to regulation). As a result, a deadlock may arise between 
the simultaneous pushes and pulls exerted on a given actuator by several physiological state 
variables. We may well surmise that some sort of compromise is reached for each individual 
actuator — but then a given physiological state variable could end up being governed by 
actuators that are subject to such compromises and therefore not necessarily steered in the 
“correct” direction, at least as far as regulation of the physiological state variable at hand is 
concerned. This problem can be solved; we shall not delve into the particulars here17. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic teleology 
The conclusion we reached in the previous section hinged on the supposition that, loosely 
speaking, the function 2  adequately encodes physiological goals. However, this wording 
seems presuppose an inherent goal-orientedness in the regulatory systems of living beings. 
Purposefulness, or at any rate the appearance of it as witnessed by our readiness to use the 
language of purposefulness in describing living things, has always been a contentious is-
sue22,23,24.  
 As we saw, 2  is essentially an inverted version of the fitness landscape. The link be-
tween 2  and fitness (via the unfitness integral 2 ) is an explicit representation of how the ac-
tion of natural selection accounts for the emergence of apparent goal-orientation in biologi-











between the organism’s realised life trajectory and its environment. To specify it in detail 
would certainly be a tall order encompassing as it does all of a given species’ biology and 
ecology. Yet this is only a matter of practical feasibility; the fundamental point is that the 
interactions that make up the fitness landscape are of a strictly physico-chemical nature.  In 
this sense, the fitness landscape “simply is there” as an objective reality. If we accept our 
function 2  as a reflection of this fitness landscape, we will have reified it and thus dispelled 
the spectre of teleology. 
 As an example of the language of purposefulness, the local minima of the function 2  
can be referred to as “set points,” or, even more outrageously, “desired” or “optimal” values. 
If we have already conceded that the existence of natural selection reifies 2 , then there is no 
real conceptual problem: we are simply dealing with a mathematical function and we may 
attach to its minima any labels that tickle our fancy. On the other hand, we do have a prob-
lem if view set point as the primitive concept: e.g. as the end-point to which the system is 
continually striving. In an engineered artefact such as a throttle governor, we know who it 
was that set the set point: either the engineer who designed it, or perhaps the end user of the 
instrument. But regulating loops in living systems are not engineered artefact. Or are they? 
 Whenever we discern such apparent purposefulness in biological systems, we could 
claim this is an expression of τέλος (telos), a final end point or inherent aim which is al-
ready intrinsic in the nature of the thing. Classical antiquity adhered to a doctrine of natural 
teleology which endowed the laws of nature itself with such intrinsic purpose25. This is per-
haps best viewed as a natural, unforced unfolding rather than a conscious striving. Intrinsic 
τέλος is cut of the same cloth as the Stoics' impetus or ὁρµή: the same kind of natural phi-
losophy is at work here, that ignores the microscopic nature of the universe and explains 
phenomena as either unforced natural unfolding, or else forced alterations thereof, where the 
forces are imposed by beings that can exert volition. 
 Whilst τέλος represents an intrinsic or inherent kind of purposefulness, there is also 
the extrinsic kind that resides in the use and design which beings capable of foresight im-
pose on objects or fellow creatures. The distinction is dulled in Western culture, inasmuch as 
intrinsic and extrinsic purposes have a tendency to come to much the same thing in the con-
text of monotheistic faith, such as the Abrahamic religions, which presuppose a personal, 
omnipotent, and sometimes benevolent supreme being. (Perhaps this is also true for other 
belief systems, insofar as power or ownership, volition, and personal consciousness are as-
cribed to super-natural entities.) 
 As the intrinsic and extrinsic purposefulness become conflated, one risks losing sight 
of the fundamental distinction between the apparent design of a biological control loop and 
the deliberate engineering design of e.g. a throttle governor. Both come to be seen as an ex-
pression of a conscious mind that has arranged apparatus (biological or brass) based on a 
kind of reasoning backwards from desired final states. The appeal of “Intelligent Design” 
touted as a creationist (pseudo-)science reminds us that, in the context of a monotheistic 
faith, the appearance of intrinsic purposefulness automatically entails the further presence of 
extrinsic purposefulness. 
 The muddling of intrinsic and extrinsic purposefulness stands in stark contrast to the 
doctrine of natural teleology, which maintains a strict distinction. This does not imply that 
natural teleology is necessarily atheistic or agnostic. Natural teleology can be seen to be 





monotheism, provided that the divinity is primarily conceived of as the first efficient cause. 
The rejection of natural teleology should therefore not be taken to be a disparagement of 
any side in religious debates. 
 The 2  integral in the previous section calls to mind the variational principles that 
play a prominent role in contemporary theoretical physics26. It is tempting to infer from the 
notion of global optimisation that some kind of teleology could serve as a central organising 
principle of all natural sciences; Max Planck for one believed that this might be the case26. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that mathematical formalism is a suitable well-
spring of metaphysical truth. 
 The doctrine of natural teleology is still occasionally put forward as an explanation 
for apparent purposefulness in the life sciences24. It is difficult to decide what to make of 
this: we cannot possibly presume to know how a Stoic would respond when confronted with 
our current understanding of molecular genetics, cell biology, and development. There is 
clearly an informational structure that resides in a germ (e.g. a zygote) that unfolds (“to de-
velop” means to unfold or unwrap) to express its inherent nature. All of this would be in ac-
cordance with the intrinsic nature of τέλος as the Ancient understands it. The question is 
whether the interpretation of DNA as τέλος would suffice for the classic teleologist: are the 
interactions between the molecules, such as modern-day chemists and physicists describe 
these, enough, or would there still be the presumption of an underlying τέλος that drives it 
all forward (slightly reminiscent of the vis vitalis — ‘life force’ — of the intervening ages)? 
In the final analysis, we do not yet have a sufficiently complete picture of what makes the 
apparent laws of nature the way they are, and thus, strictly speaking, we are not yet in a po-
sition to put teleology to rest once and for all, although we are tempted to agree with 
Laplace and say nous n’avons pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là. 
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Figure 1. Eight key hormones involved in mammalian energy metabolism, whose suites 
are portrayed here as lines in a subway system: stops along each line correspond to hor-
monal targets.
Figure 2. Alternative imaginary (much simplified) endocrine infrastructure for the system 
shown in the previous figure. (The colours do not necessarily correspond with those in the 
Figure 4. A subset of the endocrine factors and targets from Fig. 1, showing in more detail 
the processes governed by these factors. Dotted lines show regulatory actions; dashed lines 
show information flows toward the central nervous system (CNS); and heavy drawn lines 
show fluxes and biochemical transformations. The latter are the “actuators” of the physio-
logical dynamics. The regulatory component is shown as black boxes, whereas the physi-
ology (s.l.) they control is shown as coloured boxes. The boxes labelled α and β represent 
pancreatic alpha and beta cells.
Figure 5. Regions in the rat brain mediating the integration of energy homeostasis, arousal, 
and appetence (feeding drive). The sagittal cross-section (top) shows where the two trans-
versal sections (bottom) where cut (rostral means toward the front of the animal). The left 
transversal section exhibits the “input” regions: ARC, arcuate nucleus; DMN, dorsomedial 
nucleus; VMN, ventromedial nucleus. The right transversal section shows the “output” re-
gions: PVN, paraventricular nucleus; LHA, lateral hypothalamus; PFA, perifornical area. 
Also shown are: TH, thalamus; FX, fornix; OC, optic chiasma.
Figure 6. The neuro-endocrine interface pathways associated with the areas depicted in the 
previous figure. The arcuate nucleus receives several humoral inputs, among which are the 
levels of the hormones insulin, leptin, and ghrelin, as well as the key nutrient glucose. This 
nucleus contains two populations of neurones with opposing actions on feeding drive, en-
ergy use, and energy preservation, the NPY/Agrp cells and the POMC/Cart cells. These 
project to various other areas as shown and modulate the release of the factors indicated. 
The outputs are both neural pathways to elsewhere in the brain, influencing behaviour, and 
endocrine outputs via the hypothalamic-pituitary axis.
Figure 3. The Umwelt concept. The organism’s sensory modalities together make up the 
Kennwelt, The Wirkwelt encompasses the organism’s decisions on its behaviour (both 
overt and covert), development, physiology, and metabolism. The informational cascade of 
sensory integration, processing, and selection defines an organismal unit and thus under-
lies organismal harmony. The flow into the central processing machinery is referred to as 
afferent, that exiting this machinery as efferent.
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Figure 7. Adverse physiological effects accompanying hypoglycaemia (low blood sugar) 
and hyperglycaemia (high blood sugar).
Figure 8. Ball-rolling-down-a-hill analogy for selective pressures.
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